企业社会绩效评价的利益相关者模式

国内企业综合评价还停留在财务综合评价阶段，所以在评价的内容上编重于企业的经营绩效而忽视了企业社会绩效的评价。而20世纪70年代以来西方学者在利益相关者理论的基础上提出了多种评价企业社会绩效的利益相关者模式，试图更确切地评价企业的社会绩效。本文将总结借鉴国外较有代表性的两种企业社会绩效评价模式，并试图在此基础上探讨适合我国国情的企业社会绩效评价模式。     

Corporate Governance: Factors Influencing Voluntary Disclosure by Publicly Traded Canadian Firms*

We report on the comprehensiveness of voluntary corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports and management information circulars of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) firms. We focus on disclosure of the corporate governance practices implemented by our sample of TSE 300 firms vis‐à‐vis the 14 guidelines set out in the TSE's report on corporate governance Where Were the Directors? Our analysis indicates that only a very few firms disclose that they have fully implemented the TSE guidelines, and that the extent of disclosure of corporate governance practices implemented varies widely among the firms. We then test factors associated with the comprehensiveness of such disclosures and the choice of disclosure medium using simultaneous equations multivariate analysis. We also assess the influence of publicized corporate governance failures on disclosure. Overall, our results suggest that the choices of disclosure medium and the extent of disclosure are made concurrently, and are influenced by the strategic considerations of management.     

The minimum variance hedge and the bankruptcy risk of the firm

In this paper, we analyze the influence of hedging with forward contracts on the firm's probability of bankruptcy (POB). The minimization of this probability can serve as a substitute for the maximization of shareholders' wealth. It is shown that the popular minimum variance hedge is generally neither necessary nor sufficient for the minimization of the firm's POB. Moreover, our model suggests a correction of the widespread view that a reduction in the variance of the future value of the firm is inevitably accompanied by a reduction in its default risk. We derive an analytical solution for the variance-minimizing hedge ratio of a firm exposed to both input and output price uncertainty that takes into account the issue of correlation. Based on this solution, we provide a graphical analysis to prove our claim that there is a fundamental difference between hedging policies focused on bankruptcy risk and those following conventional wisdom even if positive correlation constitutes a “natural” hedge.     

Default- and call-adjusted duration for corporate bonds

Call and default can potentially alter the timing and amounts of promised cashflows for callable, corporate bonds. While prior research has indicated the theoretical importance of adjusting Macaulay duration for the impacts of default and call, the question of their relative impact remains a matter of debate [The High Yield Debt Market, Dow Jones Irwin, New York, 1990, p. 18; J. Finan. 53 (1998) 2225]. We develop a theoretical analysis incorporating both default and call effects on duration and test its implications employing a previously unexplored data base of Canadian, investment grade, corporate bond indices containing an unusual provision making it possible to identify callable and noncallable indices.     

Capital, corporate income taxes, and catastrophe insurance

We provide estimates of the equity capital needed and the resulting tax costs incurred when supplying catastrophe insurance/reinsurance using a partial equilibrium model that incorporates a specific loss distribution for US catastrophe losses. After consideration of insurer investment in tax-exempt securities, tax loss carry-back/forward provisions, and personal taxes, our results imply that the tax costs of equity finance alone have a substantial effect on the cost of supplying catastrophe reinsurance. These results help explain a variety of industry developments that reduce tax costs. Also, when coupled with non-tax costs of capital, these results help explain the limited scope of catastrophe insurance/reinsurance.     

公司治理与IPO抑价——来自中国股票市场的经验证据

Jensen与Meckling(1976)认为,代理成本是投资者愿意支付的价格与公司内在价值之间的差异。投资者对公司代理成本的预期也会体现在IPO定价过程中,良好的公司治理结构有助于降低公司IPO抑价。本文以我国2002—2003年的133家IPO公司为研究样本,研究样本公司治理结构特征对IPO抑价的影响。结果发现,控制权结构特征以及关联交易性质对IPO抑价有显著的影响,而董事会独立性对IPO的抑价影响则不显著。本文的结果表明,良好的公司治理结构可以显著地降低IPO抑价,降低公司股权融资成本。     

上市公司股权结构与现金持有水平关系的实证分析

从公司治理视角出发,以中国上市公司为样本,对股权结构与企业现金持有决策关系进行了理论与实证分析.结果表明,经理人员持股比例、流通A股比例与企业现金持有水平显著正相关;法人股比例、股权集中度与企业现金持有水平显著负相关;第一大股东持股比例与企业现金持有水平正相关,但不显著;国有股比例与企业现金持有水平负相关,但极不显著.     

就业发展型经济增长的产业支撑背景研究

现代经济增长本质上是产业的发展,只有通过产业的发展,劳动力资源才能与资本、技术等生产要素结合,转化为一种现实的生产力,实现劳动者的就业.基于此,本文认为,产业发展是就业发展的物质载体,产业规模决定就业规模,产业结构决定就业结构,产业提升决定就业发展.所以,推进我国产业的发展,是实施我国劳动就业发展型经济增长的根本途径.     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

Board Members and Company Value

This essay surveys research about the value of individual members of boards of directors. When directors join or exit corporate boards, company stock prices respond, often in magnitudes of 1% of firm value or more. Related research shows that when a significant event impacts the stock price of one company, the effects are transmitted to other companies that share board members in common with the primary company. Share price reactions are sensitive to variables such as a director’s occupation, independence, and professional qualifications. Together, this evidence suggests that a well-functioning market for directors might already exist, making direct regulation unnecessary and possibly counter-productive.